Breakout Page 5

  Targets were ordered for gunnery practice off St. Nazaire and concentrated patrols were scheduled against British submarines in the same area. These German anti-submarine patrols were unnecessary, as the nearest British submarines were fifty miles out in the Atlantic guarding against a break-out there — not through the Channel.

  Setting up such an air protection network required many rehearsals. During the first week of February the Luftwaffe flew 450 sorties simulating actual conditions as near as possible. With wry humour, the Luftwaffe code named these rehearsals "the beginning of Spring." British radar picked them up but no one was alarmed.

  Admiral Ciliax was also having his problems. For Scharnhorst, Gneisenau and Prinz Eugen were no longer the fine fighting ships they had been. Nor did they look it. The once smart, well-painted ships were showing signs of rust and were stained at the water-line by the scum of oil which covered Brest harbour.

  Although normally the German sailor is a stolid, levelheaded chap, the ships' companies were not living under the conditions that enhance morale. Sailors were virtually only day lodgers aboard their ships.

  Also, while the ships remained immobilized in Brest, there had been a drawing off from the regular ship's company, especially naval technicians for urgent requirements elsewhere.

  Unobtrusively, the crews were strengthened by the return of experts and technicians with extensive combat experience who had been posted away. But it was still difficult to train the inexperienced crews when there was no opportunity for "shake-down" cruises.

  When Hitler gave his order it left only a month to go. Would they in fact ever get the crews ready in time? Due to the urgent time factor and the deep secrecy, opportunities for training the new recruits were limited. It was not possible to let the officers responsible for trying to bring the crews up to fighting efficiency into the secret of the great enterprise that lay ahead. There could only be talk of exercises which inspired no one.

  Yet in spite of continual heavy air attacks, the repairs to the three ships were far advanced, although there was still work to be done in the dockyard. But this could not be hastened in case it aroused suspicions. For the same reason, the ships only dared to make one, or at the most two, short runs out of Brest to the Dalbenplatz for ranging practice on air and sea targets. As these short practice trips were not enough preparation to get the ships into fighting trim, firing practice had to be done at their normal berths on the quai Lannion. This firing practice was so urgent that Scharnhorst's gun crews even carried it out while she was still in dry-dock.

  While this was going on, there could be no feeling of urgency reflected upon the faces of the half-dozen senior officers who knew about the coming break-out. Yet all these officers agreed it would be miraculous if no leakage took place.

  For the perils were many. Not only did RAF reconnaissance aircraft fly regularly over Brest, but the port was working normally with French labour. Coastal traffic and fishing were being carried out as usual, and the Germans used French tugs manned by French crews. Any one of these could have their suspicions aroused and pass on information to the unseen army of French resistance agents lurking in the town.

  There was one comforting factor for the Germans. There had been no sabotage at Brest. Although there was sullen hostility among the locals, the Germans went ashore freely. Officers often indulged their favourite recreation — riding— galloping alone for miles along the coast.

  While the ships lay at the quai Lannion secretly preparing for the break-out the major task was to make the French believe they would not be leaving for a long time, and to mislead them about their destination. So tropical helmets were brought aboard to give the impression the' ships might be off to Africa or the South Atlantic. Barrels of lubricating oil marked: "For use in the tropics," were conspicuously loaded into the ships by French dock workers. Gossips discreetly spread rumours around the cafés that the battleships were leaving for a southern destination.

  A further ruse to put them off the scent was the organizing of a fancy dress party at a hall ashore. It was getting round to the traditional German masked carnival before Lent — Fasching. Not only were members of the German women's services in Brest all organizing their Fasching costumes, but a number of French officials and their families were invited to this party.

  Captain Hoffmann went out of his way to tell the German women at Brest that he hoped they would make this "Fasching" a success. Women always have new frocks for Fasching and Hoffmann urged them, "Go ahead. Buy the material!" Later he was to add with a chuckle, "But we had our Kostüm Ball at sea."

  Further to confuse the enemy, names of officers invited to dine with Admiral Saalwächter in Paris on 11 February and attend a shooting party to be given by him the next day at Rambouillet were collected in the wardrooms of the three ships. The hunting party was to be an elaborate affair. With all the formality of peacetime, Admiral Saalwächter sent out printed invitations to thirty selected officers in Brest,' and they accepted the invitations to dine with him in Paris at 8 p.m. on Wednesday, 11 February. To lend even more authenticity, sporting rifles were obtained and ostentatiously brought on board. Many of the French people ashore were aware that this party was to be held.

  Another stratagem was the boarding of a detachment of the Naval Coastal Guns with their 20-mm quadruple mounted guns. Each detachment wore grey army uniform, but instead of the usual army buttons they had gold buttons with anchors on them. As these were shore-defence gun crews, which did not go to sea, it was hoped enemy agents would take their presence on board as a sign that the battleships would remain permanently in port. They were in fact extra flak guns intended to be used against the RAF in the break-out.

  Although the final plan became known as Operation Cerberus, six code names were also applied to it at various stages to confuse British agents.

  While these secret preparations went on, the RAF were still very active. On 1 February, an air attack destroyed 300 German seamen's billets in Brest, but there were no casualties.

  Next day, Admiral Saalwächter issued a six-page Operation instruction from Paris. They were sent to Ciliax, Ruge, Captain Bey, commander of destroyers, and Luftwaffe Col. Galland.

  The instruction was headed:

  "Task: Break-through the Channel by the Brest Group—Scharnhorst, Gneisenau and Prinz Eugen under the command of the C-in-C Vice-Admiral Ciliax. Homewards in the new moon period. The task is to be executed, even if on the day of the issue of the code-word only one battleship is operational. "Forces Participating:

  "Ships: Scharnhorst, Gneisenau, Prinz Eugen—in Brest. "Destroyers: Beitzen, Jacobi, Ihn, Schoemann, Z25, Z29—in Brest.

  "Torpedo Boats: 2nd Torpedo Flotilla with T.2, T.4, T.5, T.11, T.12—in Le Havre.

  3rd Torpedo Flotilla with T.13, T.14, T.15, T.16, T.17—in Dunkirk.

  5th Torpedo Flotilla with Kondor, Falke, Seeadler, Iitis, Jaguar—in Flushing. E-Boats: 2nd, 4th, 6th Flotillas.

  E-Boat

  "With respect of navigation, the most favourable period for executing the task extends from the 10th to the 15th of February. Earliest period for setting-off is the 10th of February.

  "Commanders of Torpedo boats, E-boat-Flotillas, Channel Coast and Commandant of the Sea Defence Pas de Calais are receiving sealed orders which are to be opened at the last moment.

  "Should proceeding to sea be delayed for a short time by air attack, the Task is to be put into operation. If the delay is more than two hours do not proceed. Report immediately to Group West. Proceed again after new issue of code-word.

  "Should the Squadron leaving Brest on a correct west course, or in the direction of Ushant on a north-westerly course be recognized by enemy aircraft alter course. Then fresh start of the under-taking on the basis of new code-word issue.

  "Should the Squadron be discovered by the enemy after passing Ushant on a north-east or easterly course, hold on.

  "The decision rests with the C-in-C or with Group West. It will be based on messages picked up by the I
nterception of Enemy Messages Air Warning Service (B-Dienst). Group West is to be speedily advised about any move to return by the Squadron so that all other ports involved can be instructed accordingly and the secrecy of the project securely maintained.

  "C-in-C of Western Security Forces: The Commander-in-Chief of Western Security[2] proposes distribution of security vessels. Assistance in case of breakdown included. Running in to ports of refuge is to be allowed for. The Commander-in-Chief[3] and the air fleet will be instructed by Group West about the distribution.

  "The Destroyer Flotilla Leader has to provide according to the weather situation: On the deadline night a feint undertaken by an E-boat group in the vicinity of Dungeness-Beachy Head.

  "Coastal Batteries: The long-range batteries in the Pas de Calais Sea Commandant's sector are receiving orders to hold down by their own fire, as much as possible, any enemy batteries which open fire on the Squadron. The coast will be informed about the undertaking as far as is necessary under sealed orders.

  "Harbours of Refuge: The ports of Cherbourg and Le Havre are provided as ports of refuge in the Group West sector. Moorings and berth descriptions were handed out to the C-in-C. No special preparations for receiving the ships are being made. The Channel coast will not receive instructions for freeing the mooring berths until X-night.

  "Holding back through Breakdown: If a ship, destroyer or boat, drops out or reduces speed in consequence of the effects of enemy action, or of technical trouble, the Squadron is to continue to go ahead without stopping. The C-in-C will dispatch vessels suitable to the position that has arisen, in support.

  "Vessels will be brought up as quickly as possible by the C-in-C of Western Security according to the position.

  "As a general principle, the ships should strive to continue the progress eastwards, so long as their speed is not hopelessly reduced.

  "Any ships damaged that are capable of movement, are to try by all means to reach the nearest harbour of refuge."

  By the first week in February Paris had detailed all the forces necessary to cover the three battleships. The destroyers and torpedo boats were all lying in their allotted ports.

  Ciliax had to carry out the operation as Group West had decided in. their secret instructions. He had his share of the detailed planning and was responsible for carrying it out— and if anything went wrong he was the man who would be blamed.

  But in spite of the busy, cleverly disguised preparations, one nagging fhought persisted in Ciliax's head. Was noon the most favourable time for them to sail through the maximum danger zone, the Straits of Dover?

  English coastal radar stations were thought to have a range of less than thirty-five miles and as they steamed up the Western Channel they might be out of range. But radar detection would not matter as they sailed through the narrow Straits off the French coast for, if the weather was fine, they would be clearly visible to watchers with telescopes on the Kent cliffs.

  The Royal Navy and RAF were certain to launch a mass attack in the Straits of Dover. Group West planners summed up the Dover position like this: "At first glance it appears tempting to pass this point at night under the cover of darkness. Yet this would have the disadvantage that the ships would have to leave Brest in the forenoon and steam through the Channel in broad daylight. It would give the British air reconnaissance warning in good time. They will not only get ready their torpedo and bomber aircraft and MTB flotillas in the Straits, but might also bring their large units from Scapa Flow. Our presence at night is certain to become known so we must go through there in daylight when we can best defend ourselves."

  The German admirals were only too conscious of the ever-present menace of the British Grand Fleet. Although the distance from Brest to Terschelling was 575 miles it was only 450 miles from Scapa to Terschelling—125 miles shorter. If the Royal Navy received warning as soon as the battleships sailed they would have plenty of time to mass an annihilating battle fleet.

  But would the British commit them? Two months before, as Saalwächter had pointed out in his report, they had lost two battleships by risking them too close inshore off the coast of Malaya. The lesson of the sinking of these two battleships on 10 December 1941, 400 miles from the nearest Japanese airfield, was not lost upon the Germans. They did not regard it as a happy omen for their three heavy ships which would be sailing along the English Channel for eleven hours. Yet they decided to risk their ships through the Straits in daylight, even though at the narrowest point they would be less than 100 miles from London.

  It was a carefully calculated decision. One particular advantage was that during a night passage of the Straits the Germans would be without effective fighter cover and the anti-aircraft defences would be much less effective. They feared the night attacks of British MTBs or torpedo bombers such as had crippled the Bismarck. In daylight Galland's Luftwaffe umbrella might be able to fight off the RAE Also the battle squadron's heavy fire power would be helped by the massed escort vessels to put up a savage curtain of fire against torpedo and bomber attacks. The most daunting factor was that as they sailed in daylight along the Western Channel towards Dover they would be in an area criss-crossed, by British air patrols. Their presence would quickly be revealed.

  While the Germans went about their preparations with meticulous thoroughness and secrecy, the British, not really believing the Germans would attempt it, made some efforts to counter a channel break-out.

  During January, a stream of RAF Fighter and Coastal Command reports told of destroyer and E-boat flotillas passing through the Channel in the direction of Brest and a great deal of mine-sweeping along the French coast. They had spotted Ruge's flotillas;. One report said, "The Scharnhorst and Prinz Eugen can be expected to sail from Brest any time after 24 January. Gneisenau is not fully seaworthy and cannot sail until about the end of January." In other words, they not only had ample warning but even calculated the possible time of a break-out.

  As a result of these reports, what precautions did the Royal Navy take to see that the Scharnhorst and Gneisenaus hiding-place was turned into a trap? Their "iron ring" of submarines, on watch outside Brest waiting for a chance to torpedo the ships if they ventured from the harbour, had already been withdrawn. It was replaced on 29 January by two 440-ton old-type submarines, H.50 and H.34, which were ordered to patrol thirty-fifty miles away from the port along what was considered the most likely escape route — into the Atlantic. Two days later H.34 broke down and returned to Falmouth. On 1 February her place was taken by H.43. Twenty-four hours after the two H-Class submarines had taken up their patrol positions, RAF spotter planes reported great activity among the German ships.

  On 2 February the RAF estimate was remarkably accurate when it said: "There are possibly five large and five small destroyers at Brest. The short cut; for the German ships is via the English Channel. It is 240 miles from Brest to Cherbourg and another 120 miles from Cherbourg to the Dover Straits. Ships can make the passage from Brest to Cherbourg, or from Cherbourg to the Dover Straits in the same dark period, but cannot make the complete passage from Brest to the Dover Straits in one dark period.

  "This passage up the Channel seems hazardous for the Germans. However, as their heavy ships are not fully efficient, they might prefer such a passage, relying for their security on the destroyers and aircraft, which are efficient, and knowing full well that we have no heavy ships to oppose them in the Channel.

  "We might therefore find the two battle-cruisers and the heavy 8-inch cruiser with five large and five small destroyers, also say, twenty fighters constantly overhead proceeding up the Channel. To meet this sortie we have about six MTBs at Dover, but no destroyers with torpedo armament.

  "Our bombers have shown that we cannot place much reliance on them to damage the enemy, whilst our Coastal Command torpedo-bomber aircraft will not muster more than nine.

  "Taking all factors into consideration, it appears that the German ships can pass east up the Channel with much less risk than anticipated."


  Although Hitler did not know how ill-prepared the British were, this RAF report coincided with his view.

  Exactly as the British High Command predicted, the battle squadron would consist of Scharnhorst, Gneisenau and Prinz Eugen, escorted by six large destroyers. After passing Cherbourg and entering the narrow Channel, two E-boat flotillas of ten boats would join them. Off Cap Gris Nez at the entrance to the Straits of Dover, twenty-four more E-boats, with gunboats and mine-sweepers of the Western and Northern naval commands, would bring the total up to sixty-three ships.

  The six German destroyers in this formidable fleet were heavily armed modern ships compared with the six small, slow British destroyers available to intercept them. The German E-boats were also faster and more manoeuvrable boats than British MTBs — and they outnumbered them three to one. And the German fighter umbrella of 250 planes was ready to deal with the RAF

  Yet the German Navy was not optimistic. They accepted the risk of losing one battleship and possible serious damage to another.

  It could easily have happened. As a result of the RAF report on 2 February, Admiral Sir Max Horton, Flag Officer commanding submarines, sent a top secret message to the two submarine commanders saying: "Most secret source indicates enemy ships in Brest are ready to sail." The Admiralty also signalled: "Admiralty now appreciates most probable course of action of enemy ships at Brest will be to break eastwards up the Channel and so to home waters."

  In the first week in February, Rear-Admiral Power, Assistant Chief of Naval Staff (Home Operations), who maintained liaison between naval and air planners, talked to Sir Philip Joubert, Chief of Coastal Command. They were both convinced the Germans would come up the Channel, entering the Dover Straits during darkness. Admiral Power drove to give these views to Vice-Admiral Bertram Ramsay, C-in-C Dover. Admiral Ramsay shared the view that the Germans would reach the Straits of Dover in darkness — probably about two hours before dawn. Admiral Power reported this to First Sea Lord, Sir Dudley Pound.